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ABSTRACT 
rhis thesis ~ho\\\ hm\ a government actor can use systems them) 10 hasten the 
decline of a terrorist grotlp. The ~lUthor aS~tlffieS terrorist groups :tre social organI7ation~, 
thcrefore terronst groups come to value orgrul!7 ... tiundl suryiHd oyer Ideological or 
programmanc .lchieyements The same deternllmmts that cause ~ocml organilalwns to 
decline will cause terronst llrgalllzalions to decline. Usmg systems theory to model 
terronsm as a s)~tem, It 1~ posslhle to sho\\ how to influence these detemllll.lnts to 
mcrease the terronst group's rdte of declme. 
rhe s:~tems model alIl1\\s a government actor to build interyention ~tratcgle~ 
t<Iilored to counter ~\ specific terron~t organi/allOn. The government actor can u.\e the 
model to ldentif) and then target the terrorist's I\eak points. It abo en.lble~ the 
go\emment actor 10 determme its 0\\11 strengths and to u<;e them again<;t the terrorist 
s} ~tem weak points 
Flll.llly, the analy~is te~ts the model against case studies of the Red Rrig.lcies m 
Italy. and the Front De l.iberatlon du Quebec (FLQ) 111 ('<Inada. A C.lse ~tudy of Abu 
Nidal te~ts the prop,)sllion that terrorist groups. like other so<.:ial organizations, eventuall} 
come to v.llue org:mi/ationJ.l surVIval oyer ideological or programm.ltic achieycments. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis demonstrates how a government can use systems theory to hasten the 
decline of a terrorist organization. It shows how government's can develop a counter-
terrorist strategy by selecting intervention points to prompt the tetTorist organization's 
decline. The analysis tests this hypothesis in case studies of the Red Brigades in Italy, 
and the Front De Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada. A case study of Abu Nidal 
tests the proposition that terrorist groups like other social organizations, eventually come 
to value organization survival over ideological or programmatic achievements. 
Most literature on terrorism explains the causes, group histories, or character profiles 
of the people who join terrorist organizations. There have been few studies on terrorist 
organizational decline. Nor has the current terrorism literature given a government the 
tools necessary to develop an effective counter-terrorist policy. Organization theory can 
help solve this dilemma. Organization theory is a vast literature encompassing every 
aspect of organizations and their dynamics. Two subsets of organization theory, useful 
for this thesis, are decline theory and systems theory. Decline theory provides the 
determinants of organizational decline. These determinants are important when 
developing counter-terrorist policy. Policy that influences these determinants can promote 
organizational decline. 
There is, however, a short fall in decline theory: it does not explain how to 
influence these detenninants, or how to intervene in an organization to hasten its decline. 
vi 
To sohc tiils dilemma, we must turn to systems th~ory. System~ theory provides the 
tools l1eces~ary [0 analyze the relationship between s}stcm \ariablcs, allowing an actor to 
interYcnc and change an organization. This thesis apphes system~ theory to terrorist 
organizations. It gives a government actor the tools necessary to look at a terrorist group 





I hIs thesis demonstrates how a gOvernment actur' (.:an lISC systems theory to hasten 
the UI.:t;line of a terrorist organizatlOn. The ~nal)~ls modcls terronsm <1.., a u;nrull1e 
s)stem rhl~ allows a go\..:rnment actor to dcvelop countcr-WTTurisl stfJtegy h; . .;el~cting 
Intervcntlon puint.' to prompt the terronst organi7ation'~ (kclinc. Findlly, the anal;~i., 
tests the model agdlfist easc studle<; of the Red Rrig.:tde\ III It .. t1y. and the Front De 
liberation du Quehee (flQ) in CruJadJ. .. \ (':J.51.: study of Ahu l\ldal will be used to tcst 
thc propositIOn that tcrron~t group\ ,ire socul orgdl1llJ.tions, thcrcf{lfc they eventuall~ 
COUll.: to valu..: organi/ation ~un "'al o,cr Ideological 0f rrogramm~tie .:tehicH:mcnts 
110st literaturc on terrorism explain, the c~uses, group hlstone~, orcharaeter prnfik~ 
of the people who jom teTTonst or¥aml .. tiun~ I ittle effort ha~ heen uelhcal<:d to thc 
study of thc dyn~rnics of a leTTori~t org.:tnizatH)n llild its life cycle. \\-1Jat e~uses 11 ttl rise, 
esealate in violence, peak.:t~ an organi7.:ttion, and suhsequently dechnc? There hosc heen 
few studIes on terrorist organilation~1 dcclmc. Martha Crcnshaw':: compares llild contrasts 
~xlstmg theories on terrorism's dedine unti glHemments' ahdity to influence the teTTonst~ 
org~lli?atlon's dccline _md the oq;dnizatlon's subsequcnt re,lctiollS to its trouble~ She 
discusscs three factors th.:tt contnbute to the decline of terrori~t organizations: the 
'A gO\erruncnt actor IS an actor outside the teTTorist \)rganizution The actor can bc The 
~talc go\ernmenl. polu.:e or .:tn lIltdligCllCe agency 
~\hrtha Crenshaw', "\-low leTTorism Declines", Terronsm and Politic,ll Viokncc 3 no. 1 
(Spring 1')<)1): 64 
governments response to the terrorist actions, the strategic choice of the terrorist group, 
and its organizational resources. 
Ted Gurr and Jeffrey Rossl use Andrew Mack's4 strategy of conflict analysis and 
apply it to the decline of terrorism. They test their theory against domestic Canadian and 
United States terrorist organizations. Gurr and Ross look at the high political "strengths" 
of terrorist organizations relative to the state. Specifically, what factors of political 
"strength" lead to decline. They list preemption, deterrence, backlash, and burnout as the 
main factors influencing the decline of the terrorist organization. 
Kent Layne OotsS also takes an organizational approach to the decline of terrorist 
organizations. He suggests that terrorist groups act like pllitical interest groups. He 
states that the same organizational factors that contribute to the fonnation and decline of 
political interest groups also contribute to the formation and decline of terrorist 
organizations. He compares Crenshaw's, and Gurr and Ross's articles but asserts that the 
factors they identify are not the root causes of decline. Dots uses interest group theory 
to create his list of terrorist group decline factors: entrepreneurial leadership, recruitment 
of membership, ability to form coalitions with other groups, outside support (both political 
and financial), internal and external competition, and internal cohesiveness. 
lJeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study 
of Canada and the United States", Comparative Politics 21 no. 4 (July 1989): 405. 
4Andrew Mack, "The Utility of Terrorism," Australia and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 14 (1981), 200-03. 
SKent Layne Dots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of 
Terrorist Groups" Terrorism 12 no. 3 (1989): 139-152. 
J~rrllid l\1 Post' looks at thc psychological aspect of terronst urganization~. Post 
d~\'elops a psychological fratnc\\ork to analy".: terrorist hehavior. lIe me~ the frame\\ork 
to develop government acts which Impact on the terronst p~ychology to deter them from 
committing further acts OfYlOlence 
Current terrori~m literature docs not !;;1ve a government or agency the tools 
necessary to develop effective eounterterronst polley Th~re i~, ho\\evef. another !ield 
of research that can be superimposed onto terrori<;t grour~ to sohc lhi~ dilemma -
orgamzatlOn theory Organl/alion theory IS a vast literature cncomra~sing every a<;pect 
or' orgalll7,ation~.lild their dynamICs. -I wo ~uh~eb or organilatlOn theory, useful for this 
thesis . .lre declme thel)ry and sy~tem~ theory. Decline thea!) identlfie., the determmants 
of organil.atl0nal decline. The~e d<:terminants arc important when de\'c1oplIlg 
counterterrori~t policy. Pohe), that mlluences these determmant~ can promote 
organIzational dcclme 
rhere IS. hO\vc\er, a short fall in decline theory: it docs not nplain ho\\ to 
influence these determinants, or how 10 intervene in an organization to hasten ib dedin~ 
ro solye tlllS dilemma we must turn tl) system~ theory S)stem~ theOf) looks at the 







organizatlOn. Systems theory pro\"lJes the tools ne<.;es~ary to mmlyze the relationship 
between system variables allowing un actor to mtervene and change the organizatIon 
ThiS theSIS applies syslem~ theory to terrorist org,lllLatlOns It gn'es an goyernment actor 
the tools necessary to look at a terrorist group, at any pomt in time, and to develop an 
mtenention strategy deSigned to hasten the terrorist organiLation's dedme. 
To use these subgroups of organizallon theor), we must define terrorist group~ as 
orgalllLatlOns. The) are slmtiar to other voluntary organizations in that. (I) the group has 
a defined structure and processes b~' winch collectlve decisIOns are lJlade, (2) members 
of the orgalllzation OCCUP) roles thut are functionally differenllUled, (1) then: are 
reeogniLed leaders m positIOns of formal authorit): and (4) the organization has collective 
goals \\hleh it pursues as a unit. with collective respomibility danned for its aetlOns.' 
OiYen that [l terrorist group IS an organi/.ation. three propositions merit 
consideration 
1 4s lll1 orgamzll£1011 iI tel"rori.ll group will seek surVival over ~olll achICvemcnt 
rhl.: kader of the organization is going to do \\hate\er IS necessary to keep 
the orgallization together. A terrorist organi7atiun uffers its members the fulfillment of 
hasic human needs' the OpportUlllt) for actIOn, the need to helong, the desire for social 
status, and the a<.;quisition of m[ltenal rewards 9 To keep the group healthy and to fulfill 
these needs, the organizatIOn's leadership must main tam organizatlOnalllltegnty above and 
",\n OrganizatIOnal Approach to the .\nalysis of Political Terrorism" 
466 
"Ibid .. 474. 
beyond the group's ideology or goals. Failure to maintain organizational integrity will 
create dissention in the organization and lead it into decline 
_. There are internal and external faclors that cause organizalional decline. 
Determinants of organizational decline can be separated into internal and 
external factors. Internal factors are those that can, to somc degree, be controlled by the 
organizations leadership. Extcrnal factors cannot be controlled by the organizations 
leadership. The internal factors arc critical error, delegitimization. mercurial success, and 
burnout. The external factors are environmental entropy, government response, and the 
media. These internal and external faetor~ will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
3. Inlernal and external factors can be manipulated by a government actor to 
hasten a terrorist woups decline. 
Using systcms theory to model terrorism as a system, it is possible to show 
how to influence the internal and cxtcrnal factors to increase the group's rate of decline. 
The systems model allows a government actor to build intervention strategies unique to 
a terrorist organization. The government actor can look at the system, determine the 
terrorists weaknesses and target them. It abo enable~ the government actor to determine 
its own strengths and use them again~t the terrori~t ~y~tem weak points 
This thesis dcals with terrorist groups not insurgent or revolutionary groups utiliLing 
terror as a tactic. A terrorist organization is defined as an organi<:ation whose primary 
tool to achieve its political ends i~ political terror, unlike a revolutionary organization for 
which terror is only one of many tools in their arsenal. For the purposes of thi~ paper, 
G. Wardlaw's definition of terrorism will be used: 
fhere are two main classifications ofterrori~t organilation~, Nationalist-Separatists 
and Anarchic-Ideologues. lIarold J. Vetter defines a Nationalist-Separatist gwup as "a 
terrorist group that is united in the goal of political self-determination. \\hich may cro~s 
national frontiers to carry Out their attacks or may operate within their own countries 
:v1cmbers of these group~ usually ~ee themsclv.::s as ~oldiers or guerrilla fighwrs and reject 
the terrorist labc!. II V.::tter defines an Anarchic-Ideologue group as "a terrorist group that 
has the avowed purpose to change socia!. economic, and political systems. Some groups 
ho\~ever may not embrace a ~pecific ideological doctrine or objective, who~e aim is the 
total abolition of all govemmenL"I: 
This analysis b.::gins by looking at decline theory, specifically at the determinants 
of decline. How do the detenninants of decline effed a terrori~t organization? i\ext I 
look at how to influence these detenninants using system~ anal)sis. I dcvclop a model 
of terrori~m as a system, the model is dynamic in that it changes as the terrorist 
organi/,ation changes. The analysis then looks at intervention strategies at different points 
in the terrorist organizations life: during infancy. when the organization is healthy. and 
i'-'G. \Vardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theorv, lacties. and Counter-measures lNcw York 
Cambridge University Prcs~, 1(82), 16 
"H~old J. Vetter and Cbry R. Perlstein, Perspectives on Terrori~m (Pacific GwYe, CA 
Bwob/Cole Publishing: Company, 1991), 10 
"Tbid_, 14 
when the group is on the verge of decline. Finally I use case studies of the Red Brigades 
in Italy and the FLQ in Canada to show how government policy [intervention strategies] 
effected the terrorist organizations. The thesis will attempt to determine which 
government policies led to the terrorist's decline and which enhanced the terrorist's 
legitimacy. 
There are some limitations in this thesis. The model applies to terrorist groups that 
reside within the boundaries of the government actor, in this case one's own nation-state. 
There are some applications to groups residing in another country, but the model cannot 
be put to direct use without the host country's full cooperation. Secondly, the 
intervention strategies discussed are designed for terrorist groups not revolutionary 
organizations. 13 
Organization theory is too vast for a succinct overview, therefore this analysis 
begins with decline theory, specifically the detenninants of decline. Chapter II looks at 
the internal and external determinants of organizational decline. Each factor is defined 
and applied to terrorist organizations. An understanding of what causes organizational 
decline will help when looking at terrorism as a system, Intervention strategies can then 
be better designed to produce the desired outcome., terrorist organization decline. Chapter 
13 Intervention strategies for revolutionary organizations can vary widely from the ones 
discussed here. For systems analysis of revolutionary organizations look al Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolf. Jr., Rebelljon and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts Rand 
Corporation R-462-ARPA (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, February 1970). Leites 
and Wolf built a model of insurgency as a system and developed intervention strategies for 
revolutionary organizations. 
III builds a model of terrorism as a system. Intervention strategies are developed by 
applying the model to a terrorist organization at different points in its life cycle. Chapter 
IV discusses case studies of Abu Nidal, the Red Brigades and the FLQ. A study of Abu 
Nidal is useful to demonstrate that organizational survival supersedes ideology and goal 
attainment. The Red Brigades and FLQ illustrate how interVention strategies influenced 
the determinants of organimtional decline. The Red Brigades and FLQ were chosen for 
two reasons: First the Red Brigades was an Anarchic.ldealogue organization and the FLQ 
was a Nationalist-Separatist organization. Second, the number of violent political 
incidents in Italy ex.ceeded any other country or region, yet the Italian government did not 
suspend civil liberties to defeat the Red Brigades. The number of incidents in Quebec 
were a fraction compared to Italy yet the Canadian government invoked the War Measures 
Act and suspended civil liberties to defeat the FLQ. The final chapter will close the 
analysis, and discuss the limitations of this argument 
II THE DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE 
There are few studies on the dynamics of terrorist organizations. What causes them 
to rise, escalate in violence, peak as an organization, and subsequently decline? There are 
fewer studies on terrorist organizational decline. Nor does this literature give a 
government or agency the tools necessary to develop effective counterterrorist policy. 
We can respond to this lacuna by superimposing another field of research onto 
terrorism. Organization theory encompasses every aspect of organizations and their 
dynamics. Decline theory is a subset of organization theory. and quite useful when 
looking at terrorist organizational decline. Decline theory provides the determinants (root 
causes) of organizational decline. These determinants are important when formulating 
counterterrorist policy. Policy that influences these detenninants can promote 
organizational decline. 
In this chapter, the detenninants of organizational decline are identified and applied 
to terrorist organizations. An understanding of organizational decline will help in 
Chapter III when we look at terrorism as a system and develop counterterrorist strategies. 
Organizational decline can be broken down into internal and external factors. The 
organization's leadership can, to some degree, control the internal factors. The 
organization's leadership cannot control the external factors. 
A. INTERNAL FACTORS EFFECTING ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE 
The internal fac tors that affect the decline of a terrorist organization are: 
delegitimization, mercurial success l4 , critical error, and humout. Crenshaw includes voice 
and exit in the list of internal factors affecting a terrorist organization. IS These are 
symptoms of, or responses to decline, not the causes of decline. 
1. Critical Error 
The decisive factor effecting a terrorist organization is a critical error. A 
cri tical error is a decision made by the organization's leadcrship to conduct an operation 
that goes far beyond the accepted levcl of violence within their base of support. This 
would produce extreme responses [backlash] from its supporters. alienating the group 
from all sectors outside the terrorist organization and also beighten "disapproval" ofthose 
against it. Hackla~h can take the form of a public dcnouncemcnt of the organization, loss 
of recruits, money. resources, or safc havcns. It can cause dissension, delegitimization, 
or even exit from the organization. 
Tcclmology and resources can also contribute to the occurrence of a critical 
When the group reaches its plateau in technology and resources, it may still try to 
14David A. Whetten, "Sources. Responses, and Effects of Organizational Decline" in Iill;: 
Organizational Life Cycle, cd. 101m R. Kimberly and others (San Francisco : Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1981), 356. 
I~Crenshaw defines "exit" as either (I) joining a rival organization that appears more 
!':alisfac\ory, or (2) splintering off and creating a ncw group. She defines "voice" as the 
articulation of complaints in order 10 persuade the group to follow another direction. Sce 
Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Tcrrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches" in 
Inside Terrorist Organization s ed David C. Rapoport (New York: Columbia Univcrsity Press, 
\988), 22. 
10 
escalate the violence level against the state. During target selection the terrorists may 
lose sight ofa target's strakgic implicil.tions. rargets held in high regard by the group's 
supporters \~·dl produce critical errors. A good eXJIl1plc of this is the uss,issination of 
.\ltlo Moro hy the Red Brig,lues in Haly. This caused such an uproa.r, that the Italian 
government \\'us ahle te) enact severe antiterrorism Jaws hringing down the Rcd Uri!Cilde.16 
2. Delegitimi:f.atiun 
Delegitimization is an orguniziltion's loss of Jegitima~y in the eyes of its 
memhers '\ terrorist organiLatioll (an lose legitimacy in severul ways. through 
IcguliLaLion, goal attainment or gual Lransfornwtion. The most likely way a group will 
lose legitimacy occurs when the leuuer~ or the group deeidc to take legal actions to 
achieve thcir goals. Radical membcrs within thc group will not settle for this "hall 
heaneu" approach, they will split and form a more violent group, striVlllg to achieve the 
"pure solution ,.," ::-.Jatiollalist-sep~ratist groups tend h) fall into this category. For 
eXlUnple, the Irish Republican .\rmy ~Larted as a small tcrrorist organization lUlU as they 
esealatcd in violence, they begrul to lose support tram the southern Irish. The leadership 
attemptcd to ohtain their goals legally when they Ii.)fmed Sinn Fein. The more radical 
memhers split ofT lUld eontinueu the krror campaign. Thi~ cyclic pattern continued 
throughout the IRA's history, the Pro\"i~ionallrish Republican Arm; (1'IRA) formed in 
1('Richard Drake, The ReYolutillnlU"\" Mvstigue and Terrorism in Conlemnoran halv 
{Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 146-147. 
l1Crenshaw, "An organizational Approach", 487. 
11 
1969 because the IRA was not taking action against the British. l ! The Irish National 
Liberation Army (lNLA) formed from an even more radical faction because they believe 
that the PIRA actions were to mild. 
A second aspect of delegitimization occurs when changes in the environment 
meet the stated objectives of the organization. Without goals to strive for the group no 
longer needs 10 exist. Now. the leadership must shift goals and refocus the group to keep 
the organi:.:ation fTom disintegrating. Changing the group' s goals or focus can result in 
mild backlash from supporters, and disenchant group members who then question the 
legitimacy of the organization. Anarchic-Ideologue groups frequently shift their strategic 
goals to keep the organization healthy. An example is Action Directe in France. They 
frequently changed their goals to the most prominent anti-government issues at the time. l ? 
It takes significant resources to conduct effective terrorist operations.20 
rerrorists will often resort to "criminal" activities to fund their operations. As the 
frequency of criminal activities increases, the amount of constituent support they receive 
will decrease. Especially if their support base sees the terrorists as "criminals who rob 
banks, live in expensive apartments, and drive around in expensive cars,"" This can also 
1!1. Boyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979 (Swords, Co Dublin. Ireland: 
Poolbeg Press Ltd, 1989), 366. 
19Crenshaw. "An Organizational Approach," 471 
2GG. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), 13. 
21Michael Baumann, How It All Began C'Jew York: Grove Press, 1979), 129. 
12 
cause disenchantment among the weaker memhers of the terrorist org:mi7.ation resulting 
In further delegitimization 
3. Mcrcurilll SUCl·c.~~ 
Mercurial suce~ss is normally found in orgamzations with charismatic 
leadership It is "a rapid growth followed by a precipitous decline because rnanag~rs. 
intuxicated with success. become carele~s "" Mercurial SIl<.:<.:e5S indicates that as the 
orgmlization reaches liS full pOlential as ml organization thc leader must either level off 
thc orgmlization into a steady state. or introduce proper management into the organilatiun 
to continue development. lf thc organization <.:ontinue~ without change it will rapidl} 
decline." Tcrrori,t organizatIOns are pronc to this type of life cycle. [t is highly unlikely 
that a terrori~t group would hring in a consultant to "manage" thcir orgmlization. The 
terrorist leadcrship \\'olJld have to "legitimi7e" the organization and legally parti<.:ipatc in 
govcrnment actlYltles. 
As the group bccomcs morc successful it may become ca.rde~~ in ~eyeral 
WayS It rn~y sutTer a critical error that may dcvastatc the organizatIOn. The terrorist 
group rna) hecomc h" with operational security [.a~tly an intellig<.:nce break through can 
give a state the edge it needs to destroy the infrastructure of the orgmlization. 
:'\Vbetten, 356 
"Ibid .. 357 
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4, Burnout 
Joseph G. Rosse defines hurnout as "a proccss which a previously committed 
r cmployce 1 discngages from his or hcr work in response to stress and stra.in cxpcrienced 
in the job" and as <'a state of emotional cxhaustion caused hy excessive p~)chological and 
cmotional demands .. Living underground, the nsk llf opcr::nions, lmd the slress of 
nol taking action takc thcir toll on lhe mind and hody of a tcrrorist. Tn an underground 
org[mization, thcrc arc fcw ways to vent strcss. Bmnout occurs when individuals hecome 
discnchllT)ted with violencc. Either the~e individuals do not sec the violencc fulfilling 
their political objectives or they came to bclieve that the group ha~ turned away from its 
political ohjectives toward criminal tendencies. This leads to schisms within the group, 
rcsistancc toward leaders and thcir goab, dcclining enthusiasm 10 take risks und cventually 
exit. 'l Burnout is common among terrorists, more so in the anarchic-ideolog) group type 
Comparing the average age of Anarchie-Ideologucs L17-25j to Nationalist-Scparatisl~ 120-
50 j groups shows this:" The difference hetween the two group types is the post bllrnout 
process. Anarchic-Ideologue groups are extremely small and suspicious. \\'hen a memher 
questions the group's intentions he or she is seen as disloyaL Often the only way to exit 
the group is "feet first." National-Separatist groups un the other hlInd, ha\e a much larger 
constituent support hase. I hey are fighling for ihl.: freedom of their pcople. In these 
24Joseph G. Rossc. ct a!. "Cm'''p,",I','ng 
Proccs~". Group & Omanization Studies 
2JRoss liml (iurr, "Why l"errorism Sllbsides ,409 
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"Law Enforcernl.:nt 
groups. member~ \\"ho humout CWI ledve the vlOknt core and become part of the 
mfr.l\tructure reqUlred In supp0l1 the group 
R. EXTERNAL ffACTORS EFFECTING OR(;A_'dZATIO~AL IJI~CLl~F: 
I"lK" external factors that eftCct decline of a terronst org.mimtlon arc. emlronmental 
entropy, go\":lIullenl re~pon,e. ,Ind the medIa .. \ nation's goyernment can manipulate 
the external t:lCtors to mfluenee the decline of an org.In17.1tion. The government lTiU$1 u~e 
backldsh. enVlflmmental entropy and the media to formulate effectlYe eounter- terrorist 
poliCY 
L Environmental Entropy 
Environmemal entropy IS a reduction 1Il the capacity of the ":Il\ironrncnt to 
support an Olgani?ation:8 For a terrorist orgalllzation this means that lb base of support 
i~ collapsing and the ability to conduct oper,ltlons IS becommg mcrea\ingly risky Mone). 
recrullS and supplies become seurc..:. rh..: ~upport ha\c \\ill not or cannot suppl) ~ak 
homes. C;oycrnmcnt policy IS curt~IlJiIlg the group's dbilit} 10 move and set up 
operatIOns. 
The \ourees of eIl\lnmment.li entrop} can come from the terrorist \UpP()rt 
bClse. or the state. The 'iupport hClse can wnhdra\\ for se\..:ral rCdsons. llIey rna) become 
disenchmllcd \~ith the terrorist group. \\11en the ~upport base Ylews the group.IS nothing 
more than criminals. support \\ill quicUy dry up Recruiting will dcchn..: mId peopk will 
'-Whetten, 360 
2'lbid 
not be \\illing to put themselves in jeopardy to .:lid crimiml .:Icl1\'itie~ A critical error hy 
the terronst will ha\e the smne effect. State legislatlOn and police, and military .:Iction 
can reduce thc munber of "effectiYe political" targets the group can attack. These also 
make it dIfficult for the terronsts to mo\e. obtain safe hO\l~es and conduct operatlOns 
As the terronsts' operating em ironment dec] cases, lheir ophons decrease_ The 
terron~t group can scale dovm operations 10 reduce tht nsk of bemg caught and 
destroyed. The terrorist's leadership o;;an attempt to kgalize the organi7ation rather than 
n~k o;;ompiele de~truclion. A third option the terronst organiLallOn can take is escalate 
operatlOns to "prove' their strength and mvmclhihty Esealatmg the level of \lolence IS 
Ihe most dangerom option for organizatIOnal survival. The lIlcrcascd Violence can cause 
backlash and facditate government efforts to destroy the group 
2. GOlCrnment Response 
A gO\enilllcnt can creatc thrce main problems for a terrorist organization 
envirorunental entropy, eXlI and physic.:ll elimination The state can alfect the 
organiLation's decline by raising the cost of supporting the organi70:ltlOn. Increased 
cnnllnal senlence~ for supplYlOg the lerrori~t group \\ith money, arms, explosi\cs, or s.lfe 
houses, w1l1 shrmk the terrorists' support base. The state can enact Ja\\s forcing 
lando'Wner~ and lillldlords to pro\ide names of .:Ill ne\\" tenants to the rolice seyerd) 
degrading the group's ability to obtain ~afe houses. ltditan .:Iuthorities incorporated this 
into the "dccrec-la\\" of 15 December 1979.:'9 ['he f!0\ernment can usc political pressure 
i~Robert C I\kade Jr.. Red Brigades. The Ston of Italian Terrorism (Ncvv' York: SI. 
Martm'sPress, 19901, 208 
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or sanctions on foreign sponsors to stop exogenous supplies Ifpre:;:;un:: and sanctions fail 
the slate can interdict the exogenous supply tran$!\ctions. 
The state can enact laws that encourage exit [rom the terrorist organization. JD 
For example, reduced prison sentences for individuals who provide intelligence on the 
location and activities of other members, specifically thc terrorist infra~tructure. Police 
can use this new intelligcncc to arrcst more members of the organization. If the police 
can encourage these individuals to provide further intelligcncc, they can eliminate thc 
terrorist infrastructurc and destroy the organization. These operations will cause even 
further confusion, stress and delcgitimization within the organization, possibly leading to 
more voluntary deserters 
3. Media 
The media can playa significant role in the decline of terrorist organizations 
during their infancy. If the government down plays the impact or importance of the 
terrorist operations, the terrorist groups may never get over the initial hurdles of 
legitimization. The government must continue to down play the terrorist operations 
though the tcrrorists may attempt to escalate violence to force the media to givc them 
coverage. The terrorist group will cvcntually commit a critical error in their quest for 
JI'The Italian government enacted the first pentiti law after the Aldo Mora and Guido 
Rossa affairs. The Pentiti laws encouraged exit by providing disenchanted Red Brigade 
members with reduced prison terms for intelligence leading to the capture of other Red 
Brigade members, especially those comprising the groups intrastructure. \·1inor reduction in 
sentences were given 10 penlili who did not provide intelligence but left the organization 
vohmtarily. (Drake, 146-147) 
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legitimacy. This will isolate them from their base of support enahling the state to 
eliminalc thcm. 
Manipulation of thc media can affect established organizmions through a 
rcedueation approach [propaganda]. Reeducation can target the terrorist group itself or 
its support base. As part of its counter-terrorist strategy the slate may opt 10 pass 
emergency decrees to increase environmental entropy [power-coercive strategiesl. \\Then 
a state attempts to pass these strategies alone, it ends up dividing society when a division 
of opinion or power within the society cxists.)l To pass thcse laws without creating 
hacklash against the state and losing legitimacy, the state must also use reeducation 
strategies so an informed public will accept the changes.3l 
Authorities can also use reeducation against members of the group. A 
reeducation strategy might hegin to alter an individual's self-image which will eause him 
to view himsejf as different from the rcst of the group. This will ereate disequilibrium 
v.ithin the individual and possible exit or dissension. I will discuss reeducation further 
in Chapter IV, intervention strategies. 
C. EFFECTS OF DECLINE 
\Vhether the organization's leaders realize its impending decline or not, they will 
feel the pressure of these internaL and external sources of decline. Performance in any 
3lRobcrt Chin and Kenneth D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Changes in 
Human systems", in The P]annine: of Change, ed. Warren O. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and 
Robert Chin, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. r.-lc., 1969), 52. 
32Ibid.,55. 
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group is highest at an optimal level of stress? the same holds true for terrorist 
organizations. David Whetten also points out that continually increasing stress will 
destroy the organization: "All living systems respond to continuously increasing stress 
first by a lag in response, then by an over compensatory response and finally by 
catastrophic collapse of the system. ,,]4 AB the stress builds beyond this optimal level, 
interpersonal conflict will increase, and voice will become a factor. An increase in voice 
will increase dissension within the group and possible exit. An increase in stress also 
reduces the group's margin of error,]! at this point backlash can kill the organization. 
D. RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
Once the terrorist organization senses the effects of decline it is going to react in 
one of five general ways. The first is a defensive response. Defensive reactions are 
attempts to bring the group closer together. Strict adherence to the groups rules and 
procedures become more important than fulfilling original objectives. The group will 
attempt to defend its integrity.l6 Through their ideology and rhetoric they will try to keep 
their legitimacy in the eyes of their support base. 
The second type of reaction is offensive. This is an attempt by the leadership to 
solve the symptoms of decline, not the root causes. An offensive response usually 
33Whetten, 371. 




manifests itself as a radical escalation in violence. These are quick reactions in the face 
of extinction. l7 They are attempts to regain the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes 
of the group's members. 
Preventive reactions are the third type of response. These are attempts by the group 
to manipulate their environment, to either remove the threat to their existence or increase 
their relative strength against the state.38 The group can terminate their weaker members, 
members whom they believe will exit or will somehow jeopardize the organization. The 
group will target selected officials who are closely tied to the threat against the 
organization, for instance judges, la-wyers, and police officials. 
Another reaction to decline is fractionalization. Thls can occur with any of the 
other reactions to decline. Fractionalization occurs when a group of individuals become 
disenchanted with the organization's focus and split off fonning their own group. The 
new group is usually, if not always, more radical and violent. The PROVOS, for 
instance, were a radical offspring ofthe IRA, and the INLA formed because the PROVOS 
were not violent enough. In the United States the Order [Bruders Schweigen Strike force] 
fonned because the Aryan Nations were not conducting sufficient violence. 
The last reaction to decline is no reaction by the group. The organization continues 
along its present course and in time dies. After the group disintegrates, members remain 
37Kim S. Cameron and Raymond F. Zammuto, "Matching Managerial Strategies to 
Conditions of Decline" in Readings in Organizational Decline ed. Kim S. Cameron, Robert I. 
Sutton and David A. Whetten (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1988), l20. 
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undcrground. give themselves up ,)r join other organizations. rew lerrori~t organizations 
go out thIs quietly 
rhese Intcrnal and external factors arc tht.: building blocks for cflectlve counter-
terrorism policy. The next chapter looks at terrorism as a system. Systems analysis 
determines the intervcntion pOints in a terrorist system lo prompt its decline. Intervcntion 
points arc chosen with the ultimate intention of influencing the dderminants of decline 
III TERRORISM AS A SYSTEM 
Terrorism as a system is shown in Figure L The terrorist organization receives 
exogenous support from sources other than its constituent base. These sources often 
include other governments, terrorist groups or revolutionary organizations. 
Figure 1 TerrorIsm as a System 
Constituent support is the population sympathetic to the group. They supply 
financial and material support, recruits, intelligence, safe houses, and transportation 
networks. The inputs into the system help form the group's identity, how they perceive 
themselves in the role as the vanguard of the cause. The throughput is the group's 
process of converting the inputs into output, for example acts of political violence. The 
action itself will enhance the group's identity. A successfully executed operation 'Hill 
increase the group's cohesion and belief in its goals. The effects of the action build the 
legitimacy of the organization and decrease the legitimacy of the state. An increase in 
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(he group's legitimacy will increase support rcccived by both thcir con~titucnts and 
exogcllOllS backers_ It will also increase the kgitimacy of the group in the eyes of its 
members. The cfleCI~ of the action will (llso influence the groups throughput process, 
shaping theIr next m;tion 
rhi~ cycle will continue until a government actor eliminates the group's 
inl'rastTudure_ The model allows a government actor to choose intencntion strategies 
appropriate to the strengths of the actor ano weakIlcsscs of the terrorist group 
,\, I:XTERVIl:NTIO!'. STJ{ATFGIFS 
Ultimately mc state·s objecti\'t~ is 10 eliminate the group, whilc keeping its O\\Tl 
kgitimacy. '10 accomplish this goa!, the state must destroy the terrorist infmstrueture 
!\ccurate intelligence is essential to locate the group's leadership The most reliahle 
method, but also the most dangerous and sometimc~ impradi<.:al. is to infiltrate the 
organization. Depending on the group, a govcrmm:nt may not authorize infiltration by its 
own agents. Infiltration takcs a substantial amount or timc and more oftcn than not, part 
of the qualilieation pro<.:ess is violent illegal :lctivity. In the Abu Nidal organilation, 
members musl be in the organization at least ten yeaTS hefore assignment (0 prominent 
positions.'" \Vhen the government wlll not :lllow its agcnts to conduct violent actions, 
infiltration is impractical. i'errorists will look at a member who will not <.:onduct ~m act 
of violen<.:e with suspicion 
"Patnek Scale. Abu Nidal A Gun For Hire (New York: R:mdom Housc. 1992).224 
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In the United Statc~, the FBI has oftenatlach.'d terrorist organization's infrastructure 
directly They could penetrate the organizations with informants and infiltrators. The FBI 
preempted terrorist actions decreasing the terrorist organization's legitimacy_ Once they 
had sufficient intelligence, the FBI arrested and successfully prosecuted the violent 
lllfrastrueture of e\ery major terrorist organization in the continental United States, In 
1986-87 alone, the FBI prosecuted m-er 100 per~ons from the radical right wing.'!1 
In!1ltration may be unrealistic in the more violent and radical groups of Europe and 
the \-liddle Last where the "entrance fee" is committing illegal act~ of violence, The next 
logical step for the go\'ertJment would be to establish an informant within the 
organization. .'\gain thi~ mkes time to establish a relationship with someone in ~m 
organization who will lose his or her life if he or she is compromised 
When infiltration becomes impractical. analyzing terrori~m as a system (Figure 1) 
allows a gmemnlent actor to target alternate, but more aceessihle pomts within the 
system. The ultimate target i~ the terrorist's infrastructure, but it is also the most 
protected. Alternate hut more acces~ihlc targets are the inputs, the con~tituent support and 
exogenous support. The next lewl in difficulty is targetmg the action's efkct. The state 
should attempt to alter thc effcct of the action with the intent of d.:crea~ing the 
organization's legitimacy and increasing the ~late's legitimacy. The terrorist action itself 
is going to be the harde~t, if not impossible, to target. Throughout strategy development. 
thl: government must strive to keep or imprO\c its O\\TI legitimacy in thc eyes of its 
"'John W. Jr "Domestic Tcrrorism m the 1980's" FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 
56 no 11 (Octoher 13. 
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constituents and specifically the eyes of the group's sympathizers while it is trying to 
delegitimize the terrorist organization. Government restraint can accomplish t'lis. In 
other words, the government shouJd not over react to terrorist incidents thereby 
reinforcing terrorist claims. 
Before a terrorist group conunits a critical error, the state must continually target 
the terrorist group's identity. Attempt to create dissension and undermine the terrorist 
group's legitimacy. Then the state can target the terrorist's infrastructure. When a 
terrorist group makes a critical error, the government must capitalize on it inunediately. 
The government must use the backlash period to alienate and attack the group. They can 
develop laws and policy to encourage and enhance exit, thereby increasing dissension. 
Authorities can use intelligence received from the deserters to destroy the organization and 
its infrastructure. The Italian government used the intelligence received from the pentiti 
after the Aldo Mora, Taliercio and Dozier incidents to arrest layer after layer of Red 
Brigade activists defeating the Red Brigades. 
When a group is healthy, the first step is targeting the exogenous and constituent 
support bases to increase environmental entropy. The government can raise the cost of 
supporting the terrorist group considerably. Anti-terrorism laws can let sympathizers 
know that any illegal activity on their part will result in higher sentences than the ones 
meted out for the same crime committed under nonnal circumstances. 
Another aspect of attacking the support base is using the media to exploit the 
terrorist criminal activities. Over time this will delegitimize the terrorist organization and 
shrink the support base. Authorities must take care not to "misinfonn" the public. 
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Catching the state in a lie could result in backlash against the government. This will 
decreasc the government's legitimacy and im:rcasing the legitimacy of the terrori~t 
orgaI11zatlon 
The government may abo target the exogcnous SUppOlt link to the organi,ation 
The state can use political pressure or sanctions on another government that is supporting 
an internal terrorist organi'ation. I\uthlltilies can take direct action against foreign 
governments that sponsor terrorist organizations. such as the United States raid on Libya 
Authorities can apply political pressure to another government if the exogenous 
support is coming from an organization within its boundaries. It emmot take direct action 
against the state because they are not directly sponsoring the terrorism. ~or would the 
harhoring state allow intervention hy a foreign government inside their territory, that 
would delegitimize that government. Together with the political prr.-ssure you tim take 
direct action to interdict the supply lines used in the transactions. The government can 
monitor and freeze bank aeeoWlts. hold cargo at customs points, and seize any makrial 
or supplies destined or suspected for the terrorist organi711tion 
Simultaneously the state can target the members of the terrorist group through 
propaganda. The state can attempt to "reeducate" terrorists. changc not only their self~ 
image but their attitude and outlook toward th~ group and its methods of aehieving its 
goals. This will increase the stress and tension within the group. The increased str~ss and 
tension will creak dissatisfaction with the status quo, thereby increa~ing diss~nsion and 
motiv"tion for individual's to change their surroundings. The first step in thc process is 
to "unfreeze" the individual's current attitudes and behavior. 41 According to Edgar H. 
Schein this is accomplished by confronting the individual with one of the following or 
combination of the following: 
(I) that his self-image is out of line with what others and the situation will grant 
him or can sustain; (2) that his definition of the situation is out of line with "reality" 
as defined by others in the situation; (3) that his image of the others is out of line 
with their image of themselves or of each other.42 
The state can continue the reeducation propaganda and create a "guilt anxiety" in the 
individuaL The group's own ideology, can be used to induce a sense of inadequacy in 
the individual: the member is not living up to the ideology, the member has dishonored 
the group's ideals, or has disappointed the group's constituent support.41 The next step 
for the state is to provide the member the opportunity to "change" by exiting the group. 
The combination of these actions will eventually pressure the terrorist organization, 
with the objective of undennining its legitimacy in the eyes of its members. Once this 
occurs the terrorist organization is on the brink of decline. Herbert A. Shepard has stated, 
"Radical innovations are most readily adopted and implemented in times of organizational 
crisis. ,,44 These radical innovations are a response by the terrorists to relieve the anxiety 
41Edgar H. Schein, The Mechanisms of Change in The Planning of Change. ed. Warren 
G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Rober Chin, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
INC., 1969), 99. 
42Ibid., lOO. 
4Jlbid. 
44Herbert A. Shepard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations" in 
The Planning of Change, ed. Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Rober Chin, (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC., 1969),521. 
27 
and stress induced by the crisis the group is facing. As unethicaL as this sounds, an option 
for the government is to provoke the terrorist into committing a critical error, to produce 
outrage among its supporters. Another option is to promote the "rich criminal" Label in 
a propaganda campaign. The group may respond by escalating the violence to regain 
their reputation as a serious political force. 4l Backlash will often cause the terrorist group 
to peak in its life cycle. This was the case for both the "2nd of June Movement" and The 
Red Army Faction in \Vest Gennany. Doth groups began bombing campaigns to 
reestablish their legitimacy resulting in severe repercussions from their support base. In 
Michael Baumann-l6,s opinion, this was the end for both groups. Authorities can take full 
advantage of this situation and bring all guns to bear on the terrorist's infrastructure. 
;'Ice again, intelligence is the key to attacking the terrorist infrastructure. Any 
possible to detennine the \vhereabouts and subsequent capture of key personnel will 
undennine the legitimacy of the organization. Once the core individuals arc eliminated, 
the group will eventually die. At worst case the group will fractionate, but with the 
government in control and no support base, these smaller groups will never get off the 
ground. 
Without proper intelligence, targeting the output of the terrorist organization will 
be impossible. Terrorist organizations are usually secretive and compartmentalize 
4'Konrad Kellen, Terrorists--What are they like'! How some terrorists describe their world 
and actions A Rand :\"ote :\"-1300-SL (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation), 43. 
46Michael Bawnann was the founder and leader of the 2nd Of June Movement (1971-
1980) in West Gennany. 
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oper3tion1l1 planning information. The government can lise surveillance and electronic 
monitoring to pick lip possihlc tcrrorist tranSllCllons. traIlsmi~~ion~ or ~afc hous"5. It is 
highly unlikely, howc\'er. they ",ill ohtain sufficimt intclligenee to thWllrt the attack. 
\J.,'ithout a ~ouree inside the operational planning loop, a ~tate would nl:cd a Itttle luck or 
thc terrorists would have to make a mistakc in order for the governmcnt to prevent the 
operatIOn 
,,\nother problem l'or counter target operation~ is the evolLltion of terrorist targcting, 
Terrorist operations have nolved from ho~tage harricade siwatiolls to direct action type 
operatIOns. as~a~~inations. and bombings_ The probability of l1ffesting or capturing a 
terrorist at the targct site is almost nonexIstent. In homhing operations. thl: govcrrunent 
might be in the nght place <it the right time to minimize damage or find a piece of the 
terrorist large enough for idcntification or at least hiSloric.iI data of how the terron5t 
infillrated, sct up and executed the operation Assassinations tend to be quick hits wilh 
a short evidence trail 
The stronger the terrorist organization thc more authoritics must concentrate on 
keeping their legitimacy whilc llttcmpting to <ittack the input and preempt the actions of 
thc terrorist grullp. Once it finds a crack in the organization. the objective IS to widen it 
to a cll<ism. Analysts and officers should try to promote exil to galher intelligence and 
d",stroy the orgimizalion. As with counterinsllrgency, it is going 10 t:;ikc timc to establish 
enough intelligence on the organiulion 10 d",stroy it. The governmenl <ictor mu~t k",ep 
its legitimacy in the eye~ of ib constituents. The smaller thc basc of support for the 
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terrorist organi1.ation the easier it will be to delegitimize the terrorist organization and 
eliminate them 
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IV CASE STUDIES 
This chapter looks at case studies of three terrorist groups: Abu Nidal, Red Brigades 
and the FLQ. Abu Nidal verifies proposition one: organizations will seek survival before 
obtaining ideological or programatic goals. The Red Brigades and FLQ show the effect 
different government policies had on the terrorist organization, specifically which 
intervention strategies promoted decline within the terrorist organization's and which 
delegitimized the state thereby strengthening the terrorist organization. The two cases 
are broken down into three phases, pre-critical error, critical error, and post-critical error. 
Each phase evaluates the actions each state took to defeat the terrorist organization, how 
the terrorist organization responded, and what possible options, offered by the terrorism 
as a system model, the state could have chosen to influence decline. 
The Red Brigades and FLQ were chosen for two reasons. First the Red Brigades 
were an Anarchic-Idealogue organization and the FLQ was a Nationalist-Separatist 
organization. Second, the number of violent political incidents in Italy exceeded any 
other country or region, yet the Italian government did not suspend civil liberties to defeat 
the Red Brigades. Compared to Italy, Quebec had just a fraction the number of violent 
incidents, yet the Canadian government invoked the War Measures Act and suspended 
civil liberties to defeat the FLQ. 
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A. THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION 
Sabri al-Banna, aka Abu Nidal was originally a member uf Fatoo. the kading 
guerrilla organization within the PLO. By 1970, Abu Nidal was turning against the [atah. 
WiliIe assigned as the [atah representative to Baghdad he began to attack the PLO on the 
Voice of Palestine, the PLO's radio station in Baghdad:ll Abu Nidal saw the v.Titing on 
the wall that Fatah wa~ going to change it~ ideulogy from the total de~truetion uf Zioni~m 
and Israel tuward compromise with them. In 1973, Arafat decided to abandon 
international terrorism and concentrate on pulitieal activity cumbined with an armed 
~truggk in the uccupied territorie~ and again~1 Israel itself. Abu Nidal saw this as 
treasonous behavior and turned against the PT.O leadership. This was the beginning of 
the Abu Nidal organization. 
In September 1973, Abu Nidal conducted his first Iraqi sponsored act of terror out 
of Baghdad. Fatah began to realize at this time that Abu Nidal was turning into a hircd 
gun for Iraq. In July 1974, Fatah officially removed Abu Nidal as their representative in 
Baghdad. Abu Nidal responded by attempting to assassinate Abu Mazin (a senior PtO 
representative). Fatoo intelligence uncovered the plot, and put Abu Nidal and his hit-team 
on trial in October 1974. They sentenced Abu Nidal to death in absentia.4s This senh:nce 
passed on Abu Nidal was most likely thc turning point for the organizatiun. Not only was 




gunslinger with a vendetta against the PLO. His exploits with the Iraqi's shaped his 
vision of a very powerful organization that could be paid handsomely for its se~vices. 
In the early years, Abu Nidal lived his ideology. There is no doubt that he was 
originally committed to the ultimate Palestinian cause, the complete annihilation of Israel 
and the liberation of Palestine. Once Abu Nidal realized the power and control terror for 
hire provided his organization he lost sight of the Palestinian cause. He concentrated on 
his personal goals and core organizational survival. 
Abu Nidal based his ideology on the Ba'athist movement. The Ba'athist's opposed 
all attempts to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict by political or diplomatic means. 49 Abu 
Nidal said in one of his interviews: "Our program is based on Fatah's program, total 
destruction of the Zionist entity. Participation in Arab unity. The Path of Pan-Arabism. 
Building a democratic people's regime in which Palestine is a homeland. In other words, 
our struggle is for the liberation of Palestine, in which we wish to establish a secular 
democratic state."so Abu Nidal still uses this ideology and the symbol of Deir Yasin51 to 
legitimize his organization in the eyes of the Palestinian people and the Arab world and 
to delegitimize the Israeli government without direct acts of violence. 
49Yossi Melman, The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu Nidal (New York: Adama 
Books, 1986), 76. 
SOIbid.,77. 
SiDeir Yasin was an Arab village where a Jewish underground is alleged to have 
slaughtered about 200 Arab civilians in the 1948 war, and more recently the massacre by 
Lebanese Christians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in September 1982, when the 
Israeli armed forces had approved the Christians' entry into these camps. ( Ibid., 79) 
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Abu Nidal's ideology began to change in the late 1970's. By the early to mid 
1980's, his actions were no longer aimed at the Palestinian cause but seemed self serving 
and mercenary. Patrick Seales commented on Abu Nidal, "He had come a long way from 
his early commitment to the Palestinian cause. He had become a gun for hire, a 
nihilist. ,,52 More so than a gun for hire Abu Nidal was steering the organization in the 
direction that kept him the most secure and his organization the strongest. Seale also said 
that his investigation of Abu Nidal convinced him that what Abu Nidal "cared most about 
was the millions tucked away in foreign banks together with his personal security, which 
in turn dictated his political relations with his host cOWltries. ,,11 
In order for Abu Nidal to keep his organization under his control and sole authority, 
he continually purged his ranks whenever he felt threatened. In one of many instances 
of internal dissension, Abu Nidal ordered the execution of dozens of his men he believed 
were plotting to mutiny and assassinate him in 1989.s.! 
In mid 1979, when Abu Nidal was in Sweden for heart surgery, he appointed Naji 
Allush to head the organization in his absence. Allush became frustrated that even from 
his hospital bed Abu Nidal was still giving the orders and running the show. Allush 
became disenchanted with the Abu Nidal and decided to split from the organization with 
several top individuals instead of staging a coup. The turmoil created by the split was not 





the group. This was not a purge but it allowed Abu Nidal to reorganize and surrOlmd 
himself with loyal individuals. II 
During the "war of the camps" Abu Nidal's men came to aid the Palestinian 
refugees against the Syrian baked Shi' ites.16 Within the Lebanon leadership a new power 
base fonned, a direct threat to Abu Nidal himself. According to Seale, "Abu Nidal 
ordered the mass liquidation of his men in Lebanon (eliminating nearly half his members) 
he wanted to destroy the autonomous group that had emerged in Lebanon 
regain full control, and go underground in Libya. ,,17 Abu Nidal was the organization, and 
he would not allow a new and powerful leadership within the organization to rise. He 
was no longer supporting the Palestinian cause or he would have continued to build the 
army in Lebanon. Between 1987-1988 alone, Abu Nidal had about 600 of his own 
people killed, amounting to nearly half his total organization.18 His sole goal was 
organization survival. 
Abu Nidal was once an idealist in the Palestinian fight for Palestine. He backed the 
hard line for total expulsion ofIsraelites from Palestine. As the PLO softened its line for 
a realistic solution to the problem he broke away and attacked the very essence of his 
15Ibid., 119. 
16During the "War of the Camps" Abu Nidal's men in Lebanon joined forces with the 
PLO and once again were part of the main stream Palestinian forces. This caused the 
organization to grow tremendously. As the fighting raged on the organization grew to 




being. Iraq saw his as a usable asset in its war for oontrol within the Arab states. This 
relationship changed Abu Nidal from an idealist working toward the ultimate solution to 
a man preoccupied with money and power. 
B. THEFLQ 
In the 1960's and 1970's, political turmoil in Quebec was greater then any other 
province in Canada. The underlying cause for this turmoil was the French Canadian fear 
that the English "way of life" would engulf their cuitme. This fear of losing their sense 
of self produced a revolutionary fever propagating wave after wave of Front De 
Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) cells and networks.59 The FLQ was born in 1962 out of the 
socialist and separatist tunnoil in the universities.60 The FLN in Algeria, the Cuban 
revolution and Che Guevara's Foco theory of revolution, inspired those who founded the 
FLQ. 
The Canadian government succeeded in eliminating most FLQ cells during the 
1960' s. Society remained supportive to the FLQ's cause, sustaining conditions favorable 
for continued violence. Once the FLQ oommitted their "critical error," the Canadian 
government isolated the remaining FLQ cells rendering them politically unacceptable 
within the FLQ's own following. 
59Gustave Morf, Terror in Ouebec: Case Studies of the FLO (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & 
Company Limited, 1970), preface. 
60James Stewart, The FLO: Seven Years of Terrorism (Richmond Hill, Canada: Simon & 
Schuster of Canada LTD., 1970),6. 
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The Canadian government's success in eliminating most of the FLQ cells was a 
direct result of the FLQ's criminal fund raising activities to finance their ope:-J.tions. 
Between 1963 and the summer of 1970 there were seven major FLQ cells. Of those 
seven cells, four were broken up by police during robberies or as a result of robbery 
investigations; reward money offered by the Canadian government led to the elimination 
of two cells and a neighbor's tip of a "suspicious" man eliminated the last cell. 
The FLQ case study is broken down into three phases: pre-critical error, critical 
error, and post-critical error. Each phase will evaluate the state's actions to defeat the 
terrorist organization, how the terrorist organization responded, and what possible options, 
offered by the model, the state could have chosen to influence decline. I will show the 
affect govenunent policies had on the terrorist organization, specifically which 
intervention strategies promoted terrorist organization decline and which delegitimized the 
state thereby strengthening the terrorist organization. 
1. The FLQ's Pre Critical Error Phase 
The first FLQ wave rose from the RIN (Rassemblement pour 1 'independnnce 
nationale), and the ASIQ (Action socialiste pour I 'independance du Quebec) independence 
movements. The French Canadian political and intellectual elites in Quebec formed the 
RIN in 1960. They believed that Quebec should no longer be under English-Canadian 
economic and political control."] The ASIQ was slightly left of RIN and socialist in 
61Louis Fournier, trans. Edward Baxter, FLO: The Anatomy of an Underground 
Movement (Toronto: NC Press Limited, 1984), 16. 
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nature. Raoul Roy, ASIQ leader, preached the revolutionary gospel of the independence-
socialist movement. He became the FLQ's ideological mentor.62 
In February 1963, three RIN activists, Raymond Villeneuve, Gabriel Hudon 
and Georges Schoeters, created the FLQ.61 They marked the FLQ's "birth"on March 7, 
1963, when they bombed three Canadian Army Barracks.64 Bombing became the FLQ's 
"mark" for the duration of the 1960's. The FLQ raided construction sites for dynamite, 
caps and ancillary equipment to support their operations. 
The Canadian Government's first attempted to crush the FLQ in April 1963 
resulted in backlash against the state, legitimizing the FLQ's claims of English-Canadian 
oppression. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) did not have sufficient 
intelligence to target the FLQ infrastructure, instead the RCMP conducted a "dragnet" 
operation on April 12. The RCMP used illegal searches and arrested about 20 leftist 
activists without warrants. 6S Quebecians widely condemned the arrests, giving credence 
to the FLQ's claims. The RCMP ignored civil liberties too early in the struggle. Extra 
legal operations like this delegitimize the state while legitimizing the terrorist 
organization. 
On 20 April 1963, the frrst FLQ victim died. A bomb was placed in the back 






monument of the l'ather oflhe Canadian Confederation, John A. Macdonald, in Dominion 
Sqlwre \\ a~ the original target, but the dre~ w~s too populated. The I r.O w.:tlvists decided 
to pbcc the bomb behind the seemingly deserted Recruiting Centre. \Vhcn thc bomb 
detonated Jl killed a passing night \\ah.:ilman, \'ineent Wilfrid O'Neill."' O':'\ellrs death 
released shock and outrage. Virtually everyone in the province, including the three major 
separatist parties, denounced thc FLQ.60 O'Neill's death also created dissension within 
the existing cells, but the leadership quelled it with the explanation of "(a) revolution, 
al~~. cannot bc ~chieved without tbe ~pillmg uf blood.,,68 The Canadian or Quebec 
go\'crnment~ could have used thb b~cklJsb period to isolate the FT Q and diminate the 
FLQ's support basc with a propaganda campaign. 
In May 1963, the Quebec government uffered a $60.000 reward for 
information leading to thc arrest of rLQ activists.69 The reward became the do·wnfall of 
th..: [ir~t rLQ cell. Jean-Jacques L~nclilult. an l"LQ activist, contacted th..: RCl\lP with 
intelligence on the FLQ and collected the $60,000.00 reward. [he RC\1P used 
Lanclalllt'~ intelligence to arrest 21 ilct1\i.~ts Including the FLQ leildershlp (Villtmeuve, 
Hudon and Schoeters).'o 
"",\torL 5-6. 
6"StewJrt II 




The FLQ did not die after these arrests. They had not committed a critical 
error nor had Quebec society tired of the violence. The belief in a sovereign independent 
Quebec was still alive and strong. The few FLQ activists not arrested in May began to 
stir new FLQ activity. These new cells were not under a central authority, they were 
independent cells using the symbolism of the letters FLQ.71 
One of the new cells picked up where the first left otf and formed an FLQ 
military wing, the Armee de Uheration du Quehec (ALQ). Two ALQ members had a 
vendetta against the government, police had arrested Jean Gagnon's and Robert Hudon's 
brothers with the first cell.n The ALQ conducted mostly raids on construction sites and 
robberies in preparation for political operations. 
By the end of March 1964, the RCr.1P was under extreme pressure to quell 
the activities of the new FLQ cells, specifically the ALQ robberies. The RCMP set up 
a Combined Anti-Terrorist Squad (CATS) comprising RCMP, Montreal police and 
Quebec provincial police to destroy the FLQ.73 During a "fund raising" operation on 
April 9, 1964, CATS captured three ALQ members, Jean Lasalle, Jean Gagnon. and Rene 
Deon. CATS found a rent receipt on one member, leading them to an ALQ hide site, 
a garage. CATS set up on the garage and tailed ALQ members to several more safe 




houses and hide sites.74 By mid-May, police arrested eight members, the core of the 
ALQ. 
After police defeated the ALQ, another ceIl, the Armie revolutionnaire du 
Quebec (ARQ) sprang up to take its place. Three former Canadian soldiers fonned ARQ 
in June 1964. Pierre Tousignant, GiIles Trucot, and Franyois Schirm.7s Schinn was 
anxious to begin operations. His impatience led to a botched raid on International 
Firearms, a gunsmith shop in Montreal. During the raid, an employee alerted police to 
the robbery. In the ensuing shootout, two employees were killed and police arrested four 
ofthe five ARQ members. After the operation the police picked six other ARQ members 
in the area. Police captured the fifth ARQ raid member a few days later. 76 
In January 1966 Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon fonned the first socialist 
branch of the FLQ. They no longer just wanted an independent Quebec. They also 
looked to free the proletariat from the bourgeoisie. This was a break from the past, 
Vallieres and Gagnon targeted the unions, workers and students.77 
For a nationalist-separatist movement, the FLQ had not yet established a 
support base within Quebec society. Without central authority and control, each FLQ ceIl 
had to generate their own funds to conduct operations. On August 27, 1966, CATS 






Interrogating Rhea! Mathieu, one of the captured activists, gave the RCMP sufficient 
intelligence to smash the Vallieres/Gagnon group in two weeks.78 Canadian and ')uebec 
authorities could have used these criminal activities in a propaganda campaign to isolate 
the FLQ from the FLQ's supposed constituents. 
The FLQ was quiet through the end of 1967, although they conducted limited 
bombings to make their presence known. The greatest blow to the Canadian government 
came from French President Charles de Gaulle's visit on July 24, 1967.7'.l De Gaulle said 
France would support the Quebec people in their fight for a free Quebec. De Gaulle's 
visit prompted a resurgence in separatist fever; it also promoted Canadian Prime Minister 
Pearson to call together the Security Panel in Ottawa on August 14, 1967. The Security 
Panel came to the conclusion that separatism was now a greater threat than communism. 
The FLQ was no longer just a security threat it had now become a "serious political 
threat."80 
The next major cell arose from the most violent demonstration in the history 
of the Canadian labor movement, February 27, 1968Y Police brutality drove some RIN 
activists into the arms of the FLQ. Pierre-Paule Geoffroy and his friends joined up with 






called the Front de liberation des travail/eurs du Quebec. Influenced by the 
Vallieres/Gagnon group, they decided to support the worker's movement.82 
Through a little luck the police captured Pierre-Paule Geoffroy on March 4, 
1969. After a call from a neighbor on a "suspicious bearded man," police conducted a 
search of the "man's" apartment and located not only Geoffroy but dynamite, caps and 
two unprimed bombs.s3 Subsequent arrests broke up the Front de liberation des 
travail/eurs du Quebec network. 
On August 22, 1969, Canada's government started to implement policies 
decreasing the FLQ's freedom of movement. Remi Paul, the new Minister of Justice, 
announced a "ten-point programme to combat terrorism and subversion." The program 
included increased surveillance on suspected groups and locations. On October 19, 
Trudeau condemned the separatist movement in Quebec after some bloody riots. He said 
the violence had gone on long enough and the government had to take necessary steps to 
quell the violence. One of these steps was Bylaw 3926, banning demonstrations and some 
public meetings.84 Another step taken by police was a series of crackdowns on far left 
organizations. 
The police crackdowns in late 1969 generated two more major FLQ cells. 
The most deadly of these was the combined efforts of Jacques Lanctl)t and Paul Rose. 





to combine their efforts and form a new FLO network.85 Robert Hudon formed the other 
major cell. These two cells led the violence that spiraled into the October Crisis, the 
FLO's critical error.u 
The FLQ resumed their bombing campaign in May 7. The renewed bombing 
campaign brought the police back on the prowl. They broke up Robert Hudon's cell on 
March 12, 1970. Police arrested two of Hudon's members during an attempted bank 
robbery in Montreal. Police eliminated the remainder of Hudon's cell on May 28, with 
the arrest of five FLO members including Robert and Gabriel Hudon.1I7 
Before the October Crisis, the police broke up two kidnaping operations by 
the Lanctot cell. Police foiled the first attempt when they stopped LanctOt and another 
FLO member for a vehicle violation. Police did not question why Lanctot had a wicker 
basket large enough to fit a human body Wltil after they released him on bail.88 Police 
disrupted the second kidnaping attempt after a Montreal University student tipped the 
police off for the $50,000.00 reward.89 
8SRonaid D. Crelinsten, "The Internal Dynamics of the FLO During the October Crisis of 
1970", Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988). 65·66. 
UThe October Crisis began on October 5, 1970, when the FLO first kidnapped James 
Cross, the commercial attache for the British High Commissioner's staff. The FLO's critical 
error occurred when they kidnapped then executed Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of 
Labor and Immigration. 
87Foumier, 195. 
asIbid., 183. Vallieres also discusses the first two foiled kidnapping attempts, 37. 
89John Saywell, Quebec 70: A Documentary Narrative (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1971),31. 
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By mid-September 1970, Lanct6t and Rose reorganized their network. A 
disagreement on how quickly they should attempt another political kidnaping, f~J.ctured 
the group. Lanct6t took the members who wanted immediate action and formed the 
Libiration cell. The Liberation cell began planning Operation Liberation to kidnap James 
Cross, the commercial attache for the British High Commissioner's stafCOl Rose took 
the remaining members and formed the Chenier cell. The Chenier cell left for the United 
States in search of funds to support FLQ operations.91 
2. The Critical Error Phase: The October Crisis 
The Liberation cell kidnaped James Cross on October 5, 1970.92 The FLQ 
gave seven demands for Cross's release.9l Trudeau and his cabinet decided that they 
90Fournier, 215. 
91Ibid.,214. 
92Saywell, 34. The October Crisis is also covered in great detail from the FLQ point of 
view by Vallieres, from the media's point of view by R.D. Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning: 
Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure" Contemporary Research 
on Terrorism ed Paule Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen Md: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1987), and by a Montreal journalist, Peter Desbarats, "In Our Weeks of 
Anguish: A Journal of October" Saturday Night 85 (December 1970). 
93FLQ demands for Cross 
1. the police make no attempts to locate Cross [not read by government officials) 
2. the publication of the FLQ manifesto 
3. the release of 23 political prisoners 
4. an airplane to take them to Cuba or Algeria 
5. the rehiring of the "gars de Lapalme" 
6. a "voluntary tax" of $500,000.00 to be placed on the airplane 
7. the name of the informer who "sold out" the FLQ at Prevost. 
Fournier, 218. 
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would not accept the demands for Cross's release but they would "seek a basis for 
negotiation." Bourassa, the Quebec Premier, agreed with Trudeau.94 
The police carned out nearly one thousand raids and searches between 7-10 
October looking for Cross. They arrested, questioned, then released about fifty people in 
the raids. Police rearrested these individuals after Trudeau implemented the War 
Measures Act later that month.9~ 
The Liberation cell issued several communiques for Cross's release. The last 
communique set midnight October 10 as the deadline for the state to release 23 political 
prisoners and airlift to a foreign country in exchange for Cross. At 2340 on the 10th the 
state responded with a "NO!". The only concession they provided the liberation cell was 
airlift to a foreign country.96 
Without Liberation cell's knowledge. Rose's Chenier cell responded to 
Trudeau's "NO" by kidnaping Pierre Laporte at 1818 on October 10.97 Laporte was the 
Quebec Minister of Labor and Immigration. 98 
94Saywell. 34. and Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning," 423. 
9'iFoumier, 222. 
96Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning," 423. 
91Foumier,23l. 
98Fernand Beauregard, "Who Inspired the FLQ Terrorists?"Atlas 19 (December 1970): 24. 
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Trudeau requested the media down play the crisis so not to give the FLQ 
legitimacy.99 Trudeau decided to raise the ante and go 
on the offensive against the FLQ rather than play tit for tat at the current FLQ activity 
level. Early morning on October 15, Trudeau moved the Canadian Army into Quebec 
then "officiaily" tenninated negotiations with the FLQ.'OO 
At 0400 on 16 October, Trudeau implemented the War Measures Act, 
declaring a state of "apprehended insurrection." Officially suspending the Canadian 
Declaration of Rights. At dawn the police, with the army's support, began the sweep to 
pick up their list of individuals. Authorities eventually detained more than 500 people, 
releasing about 90% after about a week without charges. 101 The public responded 
favorably to the War Measures Act; in Quebec 32 percent believed it was not "tough 
enough" and 54 percent felt it was "about right.,,102 
Trudeau justified the early morning action by citing the need to take the 
initiative and surprise the FLQ. Formal authorization from Parliament would have tipped 
off the FLQ. Prior to dawn, and the announcement, the police arrested high profile 
99Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning," goes into great detail on how Trudeau and other 
Canadian authorities turned the tide on the FLQ by manipulating the media The media 
focused on the states activities eliminating the FLQ's power of voice. Society slowly began 
to lose sympathy for the FLQ and redirect their loyalty to the Quebec govenunent. 





sympathizers (intellectuals, entertainers and media figures) and known FLQ members, 154 
in al1.103 
The Chenier cell executed Laporte on 17 October, responding to the state's 
refusal to negotiate. The FLQ finally committed their critical error. There was wide 
spread backlash against the FLQ. What the FLQ thought would produce the revolution, 
in fact produced a surge of support for the govemment. 104 Even the PQ condemned their 
actions, "they have killed (the cause) along with Mr. Laporte."'o~ Far left organizations 
joined forces pleading with the government to negotiate with the FLQ to prevent similar 
actions against Cross. 
The liberation cell issued a communique and a letter from Cross 
reemphasizing the release of Cross in exchange for the FLQ prisoners. ' [)6 Authorities did 
not respond to the communique; they had the police out in full force looking for Cross. 
The police had been picking up a few activists in several raids and routine searches but 
the main activists remained at large. With each raid they received a little more 
intelligence that in turn lead to another safe house or cache. 
A new FLQ cell appeared in mid-November. Nigel Hamer fonned the 




][)6Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning," 149. 
I07Fournier, 262. 
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the new Viger cell through an infonnant named Carole de Vault. She was friends with 
one of its members who kept her informed of the cell activities. lOS 
Through good police work the RCMP found Cross's location. By tailing de 
Vault, police tracked other members of the Viger cell, which in turn led them to other 
safe houses and other members. By November 22 the police had identified Hammer, the 
last Viger cell member. On November 25 they located the safe house containing Cross. 
Twenty-four hour surveillance on the house soon convinced police that it was Cross's 
prison. I09 
The police began to move in on December 2. The liberation cell negotiated 
with the police throughout the night. Authorities and the Liberation cell finally agreed 
to safe passage to Cuba, in exchange for Cross.110 
Around 1400 on December 3, the activists and Cross departed their safe house. 
Cross was freed at 0200 on December 4. The activists included: Bernard Mergoer, 
Jacques Lanctot, Louise Lanctot, Marc Carbonneau, Yves Langlois, and Jacques Cossette-
Trudel.l 11 
After Cross's release the police continued their pursuit for the remaining 




lllRichard 1. Clutterbuck, Living With Terrorism (New York: Arlington House 
Publishers, 1975), 39. 
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police finally found the Rose brothers' and Simard's hideout on December 27. The Roses 
and Simard surrendered to police on the 28th after lengthy negotiations.ll2 
The October crisis ended with the arrest of the Rose brothers and Simard. 
The Public Order Act replaced the War Measures Act in December. This was a public 
relations move to ease the societal tension associated with the "War Measures Act," since 
the two were very similar. Trudeau lifted the Public Order Act on April 30, 1971, 
signifying the end of the FLQ crisis. 11l 
3. Post Critical Error Phase 
The police did not want to break up the Viger cell because they had infiltrated 
the group and could keep a close eye on their activities. The Viger cell was the last 
vestige of the FLQ that could rejuvenate the movement. If they attempted to start the 
FLQ back up or any other subversive movement, the police would nip it in the bud. The 
FLQ tried in vain to reorganize in 1971 but police infiltration made it nearly 
impossible. 114 
Starting in November 1970, the RCMP infiltrated the FLQ once their agents 





RCMP also said that until their agents begom to commit these crimes they had limited 
success in penetrating or cstablishing informomts within thc FLQ.ll5 
The state and the RCMP believed that activists would attempt to rcvive the 
FT.Q in 1971 therefore they did not let up with their counter-terrorist poLicy. On February 
12. 1971, the RCMP srs director approvcd a new "special operations Programme." The 
program put infiltration and "human sources" as the top priority. It also included using 
"po\','er struggles. love affairs, misappropriation of funds, drug abuse etc., to create 
dissension and rifts. " in subversive groups. "" 
Vallieres split with the FlQ on December 13, 1971 lIt: publicly denounced 
armed violence and said he would join the Parti quehecois. Vallieres finally came to the 
conclusion that the FT.Q's struggle was ovcr, that pcople only saw it as a "radical wing" 
of the PQ. The FLQ never had a true support base in Quebec society. Vallieres admitted 
the FT.Q was not an "organization" but a collection of groups and cells without centralized 
leadership or a united strategy. just the letters "FLQ.,,1I7 
fhe Parti Quebecios emerged stronger than ever from the October Crisis. The 
October Crisis provt:d that the Parti Quebecios was the only viable alternative to the 
revolutionary violence the FLQ preached. The rise of the PQ gave many former activists 
the opportunity for legal action toward tht:ir independence goals. By the end of 1972, 
11lG. Davidson Smith, Combatting Terrorism (Ne\v York: Routledge, 1990), 66. 
116Ibid., 67. 
1l7Gerald, McKnight, The Terrorist Mind (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. Tnc., 
1974), 157. 
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police had arrested most of the FLQ activists. They had also infiltrated the remaining 
separatist groups to the point that they could no longer function as subvcrsivcs. 118 The 
FLO planted its last bomb on May 5,1972. 119 
C. TIlE RED BRIGADES 
During the 1970's and the early 1980's Italian authorities found themselves 
combating an insurgency that by the late 1970's propelled them into a national crisis 
nearly toppling Italian democracy. Italy faced levels of violence far exceeding levels 
elsewhere in Europe: '20 between 1978 and 1980 there were 6394 acts of political violence 
resulting in 391 injured and 184 killed. 12l 
The radical left was responsible for most of the violence during the 1970's and early 
1980's.l22 The Red Brigades formed just after haly entered a period of both political and 
economic crisis. By 1968 the Italian government had begun to falter. The Socialists 
could not develop effective coalitions. This lead to a series of eight governments that 
were plagued by discontent. As the 70's continued, inflation soared, unemployment rose. 
then, in 1975, the recession began. The government's inability to handle the deteriorating 
IISFournier, 336. 
119Loomis, 145. 
'"'Robert H. Evans, "Terrorism and Subversion of the State: Italian Legal Responses", 
Terrorism and Political Violence 1:3 (July 1989): 326. 
121Ibid. 
IllVittor S. Pisano,'The Red Brigades: A ChalIenge to Italian Democracy," Conflict 
Studies 120 (July 1980): 3. 
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conditions draincd society's confidence in the political system. This acted as a "burning 
fuse" among youth. For the Red Brigades, this was the "long awaited ("'":isis of 
eapitalism,,,m the foundation for their revolution. rheir aim was to destroy ltalian 
democracy 
As with the previous case study, the Red Brigades are also broken dov.n into three 
phases: pre-critical error, critical error, and post-critical error. Each phase will evaluate 
the state's actions to defeat the terrorist organi.:ation, how the terrorist organization 
responded, and what possihle options, offered by the model, the state could have chosen 
to influence decline. 1 will demonstrate the affect government policies had on the 
terrorist organi.:ation, specifically which interventiotl strategies promoted terrorist 
organization decline and which delegitimized the state thereby strengthening the terrorist 
organization. 
Compare the Canadian responses to the FLQ, to the Italian responses to the Red 
Brigades. Italy's government maintained constitutional liherties throughout the Red 
Brigade cri5is. 124 Unlike the RCMP, Italian police did not use extralegal means to 
establish their intelligence base nor did they make "arrests in the dark." Parliament 
expanded police arrest and detention powers considerably. but they also set lime limits for 
detention and monitored police activities,I:5 Italy avoided the reactionary responses the 





repressively reinforcing the legitimacy of the FLQ. 1broughout the Red Brigade 
emergency, the Italian government kept its legitimacy in the eyes of its constitue".ts and 
came out of the crisis stronger and with increased credibility. 
1. Red Brigades Pre-Critical Error Phase 
On 8 September \969, Renato Curcio and his wife Margherita Cagol founded 
the Collet/iva Politico Metropolitano (Metropolitan Political Collective). This was the 
foundation for the Red Brigades. 126 Curcio and Cagol developed their political views as 
stuclent activists at the University of Trento. Curcio believed that there was a direct 
correlation between the stuclent and worker movements. Curcio decided to combine these 
two forces into a political revolution, and the Collective was the means to achieve the 
revolution.127 The Collective changed its name to Sinistra proletaria (Proletarian Left) 
in early 1970. Sinistra proletaria produced a political publication (by the same name) to 
spread the word of their revolution. 128 Sinistra proletaria's October 1970 issue armounced 
the creation of the Red Brigades. The Red Brigades' communiques told of an 
organization dedicated on the Marxist tradition of revolution: armed repression of the 
ruling class in the name of the proletariat, "for every eye, two eyes; for every tooth, an 
entire face.,,129 
127Meade, 39. 
l2!Alison Jamieson, The Heart Attacked: Terrorism aDd Conflict in the Italian State 
(London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1989), 72. 
12"Drake, 11. 
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The first serious threat to the Italian government was the kidnaping of Judge 
Mario Sossi in Genoa on 18 April 1974. Sossi's kidnaping was a significant jump in the 
level of violence. Four thousand police searched unsuccessfully for Sossi.1l0 In a 
communique, the Red Brigades demanded the release of eight political prisoners in 
exchange for Sossi, or they would execute the judge. Despite the government's refusal 
to negotiate with the Red Brigades, a court granted an application from Sossi's family for 
the release of the prisoners. The government appealed the decision, and did not release 
the prisoners. The Red Brigades freed Sossi after 35 days, without any concessions.nl 
This was a huge propaganda success for the Red Brigades, not only were they able to 
denounce the Italian government, they were also able to publicize their ideology and 
finally gain national attention. In Little did they realize the new attention would destroy 
them. 
In response to the Sossi affair, the Italian government named General Dalla 




13lltaly had three separate "police" forces all under the auspices of a "state police": the 
carabinieri under the Minister of Defense, the Corps of Public Safety under the Minister of 
the Interior, and Finance Police under the Minister of Finance. Each branch had their own 
intelligence gathering operations and worked independently of each other against the Red 
Brigades. In 1981 all three branches of police were put under civilian administrative control, 
the Minister of the Interior, but all three still kept their independent operational control. 
(Meade, 332) 
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brigade In September 1974, 
Chiesa and the carabinieri established an informant, Silvano Girotto, Ul willing to infiltrate 
the Red Brigades. On September S, at a meeting Girotto set up to join the Red Brigades, 
the carabinieri captured Curcio and Francechini (another brigatisti). 
The carabinieri made other arrests and located several safe houses during 
September. During these arrests the police noticed a "habitual weakness" of the Red 
Brigades, they maintained archives, target information and associated intelligence at their 
safe houses. lJ6 The intelligence received during the raids enabled the carabinieri to target 
the next layer of the organization, keeping the Red Brigades Wlderground and quiet. 
On 22 May 1975, Parliament passed the first law aiding police in the battle 
against terrorism, law 152 the legge Reale. The law allowed police to detain, stop and 
search individuals. Italian or foreign, who associated with the extreme left, extreme right 
or the mafia. Legge Reale also suspended provisional liberty (release on bail) for crimes 
1~4Chiesa made a name for himself as a carabinieri colonel in Sicily fighting the mafia. 
In 1973 Chiesa was promoted to General and took the first carabinieri brigade in Turin. 
Chiesa tried to publicize the activities of the carabinieri so the people would see that the state 
was "present and actively defending itself and its laws." Chiesa knew the importance of 
maintaining the state's legitimacy to keep the people's support behind the government and not 
the subversives. (Jamieson, 58) 
13SGirotto was a colorful character who started as a thief, did time in the French Foreign 
Legion, then became an ordained priest (Father Leo] in the Franciscan order. Father Leo 
went to Bolivia and Chile to help the 'wretched of the earth'. Father Leo developed a 
theology of armed conflict while in Latin America. When he returned to Italy the press made 
him famous 
as 'Friar Machine-GWl'. (Ibid) 
)]~bid., 60. 
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committed under certain articles. Law 152 increased sentences and preventive detention 
for specific crimes. It also gave the police more protection, making it dif:cult to 
prosecute police for using their fire arms or for using physical force in the line of duty.!37 
In January 1976, Chiesa's men found and rearrested CurciO. IJ8 By now, the 
Red Brigades were on the brink of defeat. There were about 15 regulars left, with Mario 
Moretti emerging as the leader. Faced with defeat Moretti had two alternatives to choose 
from, admit defeat or escalate the violence and start a war. Moretti chose war. 1l9 This 
was the end of the first wave of brigatisti, Moretti would soon regroup the Red Brigades 
and begin an escalated wave of violence. 
The Italian Communist Party (PCT) received a substantial increase in votes 
during the national elections held in June 1976. The Christian Democrat Party (DC) no 
longer could form a majority ooalition without the communists. Aida Moro, the President 
of the DC, aided Giulio Andreotti in forming a new government. Moro and Andreotti 
came to an agreement with Berlinguer, the PCT leader: the DC could withstand a vote 
of confidence with the abstentions of the left to form a government of "non-opposition. ,,140 
To many youth, the PCI betrayed the revolution, this pushed the radicals into the arms 







There was a student movement in the universities in 1977. Students revolted 
several times during the year, demonstrating, marching, and taking over the univ~rsities. 
The state responded by adding anti-demonstration articles to the legge Reale and passing 
it on 8 August 1977. 142 These articles did not quell the rising revolutionary fever. 
To the Red Brigades, the whole situation was an omen of the revolution. The 
economy was in ruins, and the university "movement" was spreading the revolutionary 
flame throughout Italy. The Red Brigades believed the movement was a broad based 
anned proletariat movement, the base to build the revolution on. Their view was flawed 
though: the movement was mainly a student movement with mixed ideologies. It was not 
a worker's movement or an ideological movement.143 These misperceptions contributed 
to their downfall. They never had the proletariat's support; they never swam in friendly 
waters. 
As the internal situation deteriorated, Italy's "non-opposition" government fell 
in January 1978. In February, Moro met with Berlinguer and came up with a solution to 
the governmental crisis. Moro proposed: (a) a common program of political and 
economic measures to meet the emergency; (b) affinnative votes by the other parties for 
the government (rather than the previous abstentions); and (c) a pledge to cooperate in 
promptly enacting the program. The PCI would become a fonnal part of the majority in 





March 1, Moro brought the DC factions together to approve his solution. Parliament set 
deliberations for the new cabinet for 16 March, a day party leaders knew would go down 
in Italian political history. The Red Brigades ensured that it did. 
2. The Critical Error Phase 
The Red Brigades committed several critical errors. Each one could have 
brought them down, had the state used the periods of backlash to launch a propaganda 
campaign together with direct action. Instead, the Italian government allowed the Red 
Brigades to regroup and justify their actions. 
The Red Brigades kidnaped Aldo Moro the morning of March 16. Backlash 
was substantial from all quarters of society. The union federation called a nation wide 
strike. Millions of people took to the streets. Christian Democrats and communists alike 
stood together against the actions of the Red Brigades.145 This popular anti-brigatisti 
sentiment did not last though. A combination of police, carabinieri and finance guards 
set up approximately thirteen hundred road blocks a day, one-hundred sixty in Rome 
alone. The police searched "tens of thousands" of homes in hopes of locating More. 
Many doors were smashed in when the tenants were not home. Society's patience began 
to wear thin when it appeared the inconvenience of road blocks and damage sustained 




The government was united in their response not to negotiate with the 
terrorists. The Red Brigades issued several communiques accusing Moro of crimes 
against the people, that a people's tribunal would try him. The sixth communique issued 
on 15 April said that Moro had been found guilty and sentenced to death. Authorities 
realized that any concession given to the Red Brigades, in exchange for Moro, would be 
catastrophic for the state and only lead to legitimize Red Brigade propaganda. 15 Italian 
authorities rejected all concessions offered by the Red Brigades. On the morning of 9 
May 1978, Aldo Moro bled to death in the trunk of a car after being shot extensively by 
two brigatisti. 
The Moro affair displayed the vast inadequacies of Italian counter-
terrorism/insurgency capabilities. Initially after the incident, authorities released names 
and photos of suspects, of which very few were Red Brigades let alone involved in the 
kidnaping. They were slow to react to intelligence. They failed to tail leftist organization 
leaders to see if they were keeping contact with the Red Brigades. The individual 
"police" forces did not coordinate their efforts. There was no core group in charge of the 
investigation. Higher authority did not release the magistrate in charge of the case of 
other duties, nor did he have a "terrorist expert" to help him. Nor did the Italians have 
a central comprehensive data base on the Red Brigades. 147 
In response to Aida Moro's death, Parliament passed law 191, "Penal and trial 
norms for the prevention and repression of serious crimes." on 18 May 1978. It increased 
147Ibid., 174-177. 
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the police's power to track terrorists, authorized wire taps without special demonstration 
of cause, and authorized 24 hour detention for individuals refusing to reveal their ;dentity 
or with suspicious papers.14! The state also established a national anti-terrorist group 
under the Minister of the Interior, headed by Chiesa. Chiesa selected 180 carabinieri and 
50 police, who began proper counter-terrorist intelligence work with results "not long in 
coming."J4~ 
The Moro incident did unite the "diverse terrorist groups of the left" by 
maintaining a crisis atmosphere through the remainder of 1978. What this atmosphere did 
produce for the Red Brigades was a feeling of invincibility. On January 24,1979 they 
assassinated Guido Rossa in his car. Rossa was an Italian Communist's communist, a 
factory worker who supported the communist party line of anti_terrorism. 11o 
Rossa's death caused spontaneous eruptions of strikes and demonstrations in 
all the major factories of Genoa to protest the "Fascist Brigadists." More than half a 
million people lined the streets of Genoa for his televised funeral.l>j The backlash from 
Rossa's death far exceeded the reaction to Moro's death. This was the second critical 
error for the Red Brigades; it could have brought them down. The state failed to 






delegitimized the Red Brigades organization, promoled dissension among its members and 
broke lhem up. 
In the summer of 1979, the Red Brigades sustained a major schism. On 25 
July 1979 Lotta Conlinua published an anonymous article, later attributed to captured 
brigatisti Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda. It contained a fierce accusation against 
"the strategic direction" of the Red Rrigadcs. Morucci and Faranda accused the Red 
Brigades of having "too much arrogance and too much presumption" for mistaking 1979 
Italy for 1917 Russia or 1949 China. 1s2 This was a continuation ofthc schism that started 
with thc Aldo Moro affair. The group did not meet their strategic objectives during or 
after the ~oro crisis and this resulted in internal dissension. The Rossa affair further 
fueled the internal crisis culminating in the MoruccilFaranda denunciation. Red Rrigade's 
lcadcrship rcsponded to this outward qucstioning of Rcd Brigadism by escalating thc level 
of violence to prove to both group members and supporters that they were still alive and 
well. 
Marucci and Faranda's article demonstrates the terrorist organization's vulnerability 
to psychological attack after a critical error. Their article showed the internal dissension 
created by the Mora and Rossa affairs' backlash. Red Brigade members began to 
question the group's direction and decision making ability. Authorities must capitalize 
on this intcrnal crisis by targeting thc group's idcntity. A propaganda campaign dircctcd 
112Ibid., 102. 
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at the Red Brigade's identity (Terrorism As a System, Figure 1) would have increased the 
pentiti rate even further, hastening the decline of the group. 
As the new year unfolded, the Red Brigades were in the throws of defeat. On 
6 February 1980, Parliament passed Law 15.m Law 15 looked favorably on those who 
would dissociate themselves "from the other (brigatista), would try to prevent criminal 
activity being carried to its full consequences, or would concretely help the police and the 
judicial authority to obtain decisive proof to identify and capture" terrorists. For these 
individuals, the pentiti, Law 15 could reduce life sentences 12 to 20 years, and cut other 
sentences in half. It was the most severe anti-terrorist law passed yet, but also the most 
generous to the pentiti. The police then began a campaign to coopt repentant terrorists. 
On 20 February General Chiesa announced the capture of Rocco Micaletto and 
Patrizio Peci, two of the most wanted and feared Red Brigade chiefs. Shortly after his 
capture, Peci publicly abandoned the Red Brigades. Peci was the leader of the Turin 
column and a member of the Strategic Direction. The information he provided the police 
brought devastation to the Red Brigades, it directly resulted in 85 brigatisti arrests and 
the location of many bases. 114 These arrests quieted the Red Brigades until the fall of 
1980. The pentiti laws were killing the Red Brigades. 
IIJLaw 15 stated: (a) All crimes of terrorism or subversion of the democratic order that 
were not punishable with life sentences would be doubled; (b) Attempted murder was 
increased to 20 yrs, 18 yrs for serious lesions (knee capping),and all penalties would be 
increased for crimes against a member of the government, parliament, judiciary or the police; 
and (c) Terrorist suspects could be detained for 48 hrs. (Evans, 340) 
114Meadc, 194. 
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The Red Brigades began another offensive on 27 October 1980 with an 
unsuccessful prison break. In late November, they conducted four kidnapings. The second 
kidnaping was Giuseppe Taliercio, director of Montedison in Porto Marghera. The Red 
Brigades justified the kidnaping, by saying Taliercio was a "servant of the imperialist 
multinationals" and having mercilessly exploited the workers of Monte dis on for more than 
thirty years, he would now have to face proletarian justice.1.\5 The Taliercio kidnaping 
resulted in extreme backlash. Contrary to their expectations (provoking a surge of 
revolutionary fervor and gratitude among the workers), the incident induced a protest 
march of sixty-thousand demonstrators in Mestre against the "Nazi Red Brigadists.'0156 
Again this was a critical error for the Red Brigades that Italian authorities could have 
exploited. 
In one last attempt to revitalize the revolution the Red Brigades targeted 
NATO assets. On 17 December 1981, the Red Brigades kidnaped General James Lee 
Dozier, Deputy Chief of Staff for logistics and administration at NATO's headquarters in 
Southern Europe. l57 The Red Brigades' goal in kidnaping General Dozier was to help in 
their quest for a mass following. Their previously selected targets had not won them the 
support of the proletariat. What they did not realize was that a foreign target would unite 





All Italian security force elements were committed to NATO and did not want 
to seem incompetent before their NATO counterparts, especially the Americans. <;;0 they 
put aside their differences and cooperated on the Dozier case. 15S The police received a 
tip on Dozier's location from an informant. On 27 Jan 1982, the police surrounded an 
apartment house on Via Pindemonte in Padua. They waited Wltil the morning rush hour 
covered their movements then a NOCS team assaulted the apartment. They captured five 
terrorists, along with submachine guns, hand grenades, plastic explosives, ammunition, 
money, false 10 cards and intelligence on political and prominent leaders in the area. IS9 
3. Post Critical Error Phase 
The greatest intelligence received on the Red Brigades was that they would 
not put up a fight when cornered. l60 Authorities released this information to the public. 
The hwniliation created within the Red Brigades caused an implosion within the 
organization, increasing the pentiti rate above any other period. To alleviate the increased 
pentiti rate, Parliament passed law 304 on 29 May 1982, which quickly became known 
as the pentiti Law. It distinguished between dissociation from terrorism and collaboration 
with the authorities. Dissociation brought forth a reduction in life-sentences to 15 to 21 
years and decreasedother sentences by one third. Collaboration brought forth a reduction 
in life-sentence to 10-12 years, and decreased other sentences by one half not to exceed 




10 years. Exceptional information could reduce sentences by another third. 161 The sole 
purpose of law 304 was to defeat terrorism by bringing terrorist forward, con"incing 
imprisoned terrorists they had been defeated, to admit their quilt and provide intelligence 
on their brethren. 162 The intelligence gained from the pentiti increased as more raids and 
arrests smashed the remaining Red Brigades infrastructure through the end of 1982. 
4. Summary 
Two main reasons tor Italy's success in defeating the Red Brigades were their 
ability to maintain constitutional liberties and not resort to extralegal means during the 
emergency. They did not form death squads, they did not have hidden prisons, nor did 
they make "arrests in the dark." The use of torture was also rare. l6J Parliament preserved 
the right to counsel and legal representation, and the preswnption of innocence. 
Authorities did not censor the press. 1M Parliament expanded police powers considerably 
concerning arrests and detention. They also set time limits and enforced them through 
monitoring. 1M The state avoided reactionary responses, which the Red Brigades were 
16lEvans, 342. 
161Ibid., 343. 
16JTbe only documented torture case the author found was during the trial of brigatisti Di 
Lenardo, the four police officers responsible were put to trial, found guilty, and sentenced to 
prison. The police medical examiner found about fifty electric burn marks on Di Lenardo's 
testicles. See Richard Oliver Collin and Gordon 1. Freedman, Winter of Fire: The Abduction 





hoping for. Through all this the Italian government kept its legitimacy in the eyes of its 
constituents and came out of the emergency stronger with increased credibility. 
The Italian government could have defeated the Red Brigades sooner had it 
consolidated its security forces. It wasn't until the Dozier affair that the "police" forces 
banded together and pooled their resources for an all out assault on the Red Brigades. 1M 
The Italian secret service could have also been a factor in increasing the pace of Red 
Brigades decline. In the late 1960's and early 1970's the state charged SID with 
Parliamentary espionage, sponsoring right wing terrorism, and corruption. 167 Reform was 
necessary but the timing could not have been worse. The Italian secret service (SID) was 
in the process of being restructured into the SISMI16~ and the SISDEl69 prior to the Mora 
affair. Neither SISMI nor SISDE was operational by 16 March. Higher authority 
disbanded Chiesa's group and the larger SDS and transferred their experienced personnel 
out of the anti-terrorism arena. Authorities disbanded the SID before forming SISMI and 
SISDE, leaving a gap in operational capabilities when they were needed most. 
Italy had come perilously close to the edge of collapse. Government 
instability made it clear that they had to maintain opposition support so the system would 
not fail and democracy would prevail. Aldo Moro had sufficient forethought to establish 
166Evans, 334. 
167Ibid., 333. 
16SSISMI is the military secret service in charge of external security, espionage and 
counter-espionage. ( Meade, 176) 
169SISDE is the information service charged with internal security. (Ibid) 
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a \vorking relationship with the PCI to save not only the DC party but Italy itself. He 
knew the time had come to include the PCI in the government, building a united front 
against terrorism. Througb it all the government maintained civil liberties reducing the 
terrorist's base of support, while the security forces conducted effective policc work 
together destroying the Red Brigades. 
D. CONCLUSTON 
The FLQ case study displayed the RCMP's extralegal counter-terrorist policy and 
intelligence gathering means propagated continuous FLQ cells and networks. The RCMP 
had for years, before obtaining increased legal authority, illegally opcncd mail, cntcred 
premises surreptitiously, conducted illegal searches and framed suspects. 170 As police 
eliminated a cell or network, another formed to take its place. Not until the October 
Crisis, the FLQ's critical error, did Quebec society twn again:;t the FLQ and accept the 
War Measures Act. 
The Red Brigades showed that even after committing several critical errors, the 
group could operate at a significant levcl. Thc Ked Brigades implodcd once Italian 
authorities used the backlash to their advantage. The Italian government was internally 
weak. The DC had to maintain PCI support to keep the government from falling. DC's 
fragile alliance with the PCI precluded the government from repressing Italian society. 
They had to keep police operations legitimate, good police work vice illegal intelligence 
'7!1p-ournier, 135. 
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operations. Italy as a whole emerged stronger politicaJly from the Red Brigade crisis, 
whereas the Canadian left emerged stronger from the FLQ crisis. 
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V CONCLUSION 
The primary concern and focus for a state, when conducting counter-terrorist 
operations is not to overreact. A state must maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its 
constituents. A repressive government will give the terrorist organization legitimacy and 
substantiate its rhetoric. This may push marginal individuals into the terrorists awaiting 
hands. 
When the state down-plays the terrorist event there is a good chance the terrorists 
will escalate the level of violence. By escalating violence, the terrorists are trying to force 
the state to react advantageously to the terrorists. They are trying to get the state to over 
react and invoke "emergency" legislation, to suspend civil liberties or repress society. 
These reactions build the terrorist group's identity and increase their base of support. The 
state must continue to down-play the terrorist actions, and begin a propaganda campaign 
targeting the terrorist group's identity while developing legislation to promote exit. Then 
when the terrorist commits a critical error, society will be more apt to accept legislation 
designed to restrict the terrorist's environment. Eventually the terrorists will over extend 
their bounds and commit a critical error in their attempt to delegitimize the state. The 
state must take advantage of the backlash period to enact a strategy aimed at the terrorist's 
infrastructure. The terrorist organization is at its most vulnerable point. As backlash 
most often promotes dissension, authorities must act quickly to create a split and eliminate 
the terrorist infrastructure. 
10 
Italian authorities could have eliminated the Red Brigades after the Moro affair if 
they had they used public backlash in their favor. The pen/iii did create schisms within 
the Red Brigades but the Brigades did not implode until Italian authorities began a 
propaganda campaign against the Red Brigades following the Dozier affair. 
Canadian authorities used the October Crisis to move the entire Canadian army and 
tactical airforce into Quebec against the FLQ. 171 Trudeau supported military intervention 
by invoking the War Measures Act, which more than 85 percent of Quebec citizens 
supported. Had Trudeau moved the army in earlier it couid have created backlash against 
the state and prolonged the crisis. 
Another key issue for the state during its campaign against terrorism is civil 
liberties. Suspended civil liberties tend to push fence sitters over the edge into the 
terrorist's arms. Even in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, Italian authorities 
did not suspend civil liberties. The only time authorities "repressed" Italian society 
immediately followed the Moro kidnaping. Police set up many road blocks and forced 
entry into vacant homes in their search for Moro. When the Red Brigades had finally 
been defeated, Italian democracy emerged stronger than it had in years. 
Before the October Crisis in Quebec, extralegal RCMP operations kept producing 
wave after wave of FLQ activists. Most of these new members knew FLQ activists but 
normally would not have joined. Only after the Chenier cell assassinated Laporte, FLQ's 
critical error, did Quebecians show support for Canadian authority and the War Measures 
171Except for one infantry battalion and one armored regiment held back in Calgary. 
(Loomis, 142) 
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A(..1. The War Measures act did create dissension in both the Quebec and Ottawa 
governments though. 
The Red Brigades and the FLQ cases showed that good solid police work is key for 
targeting the terrorist organization itself. In both situations good police work built the 
intelligence required. to eliminate the infrastructure. In Quebec, the RCMP had the added 
advantage of a financially troubled FLQ. Police eliminated four of the nine main FLQ 
cells during or resulting from FLQ fund raising activities. 
This analysis demonstrated a shomall inherant in using systems analysis. A 
government actor cannot guarantee that an intervention strategy will produce the desired 
response in the terrorist organization. Human beings make up terrorist organizations, and 
humans can act in incomprehensible ways at times. Authorities must maintain control and 
not over react even though an intervention strategy may produce the opposite response 
dcsircd. 
This thesis found that the flIst proposition might require revision. The flIst 
proposition stated: as organizations. terrorists v.ill seek organizational survival over goal 
achievement. This is not necessarily true for all terrorist organizations. Tradition and 
blood are the roots of nationalist groups like the IRA. The goal of a free Ireland is more 
important than the organization itself. Nationalist terrorists who no longer want the 
underground life, find it easier to become reaccepted. back into society. The proposition 
does apply to Anarchic-Ideologue groups, especially where they are not readily accepted 
back into society. The Abu :-ridal case study revealed that Abu Nidal, the man. often used 
state sponsorship and internal purges to maintain his organization's integrity and health. 
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Abu Nidal did keep the organization's health and survival above the Palestinian cause. 
A terrorist organization does provide its members "primitive" societal needs. If the 
capability to fulfill those needs is receding, the organization must change its fOCllS or 
cease to exist. 
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